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iNtRoDuCtioN
The global financial crisis starting in 2008 led to a global 
economic recession on a scale not seen since World War II. 
In an effort to dampen the economic slowdown, several 
countries responded to the crisis with countercyclical fiscal 
policies. In 2009 and 2010 respectively, fiscal expansion 
amounted to 0.7-0.8 percent of GDP in the euro area.1 As a 
result, the structural budget balance of euro area member 
states2 deteriorated significantly between 2008 and 2010 
(see Chart 1).
Government efforts to boost demand contributed to the 
stabilisation of demand. While the fiscal stimulus packages 
were intended to be temporary, growing public deficits 
foreshadowed deteriorating debt dynamics in several euro 
area member states. Risks related to public debts were 
further exacerbated by the government guarantees 
undertaken with a view to protecting the financial system. 
The intensification of the Greek debt crisis in early 2010 
aggravated investors’ concerns about the sustainability of 
the public debt of other European countries. Thus an 
increasing number of governments announced adjustment 
plans from the middle of the year in the euro area countries. 
This is also reflected in the budgetary position forecasts of 
the euro area: according to the forecast of the IMF, deficit 
reduction measures may improve the structural balance of 
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In the wake of the Greek debt crisis, concerns about the sustainability of public debt have intensified. As a result, from 
the summer of 2010 several euro area member states announced fiscal austerity measures. These adjustments have a 
significant impact on the economic outlook of the euro area and, indirectly, Hungary. Over the short term, the spending 
cuts will reduce demand and restrain inflation in the euro area, resulting in restricted export opportunities for the 
Hungarian economy. Fiscal adjustments in Western Europe cutting public expenditures by a total of 1 percent of GDP 
for a period of two years could lower the growth rate of the Hungarian economy by 0.2 percentage points each year. In 
the context of declining import prices and a downturn in domestic demand, inflation is expected to moderate, albeit to 
a negligible extent. Somewhat stronger effects should be expected if the debt crisis of the euro area’s peripheral 
countries escalates further, and the increasing domestic debt burden driven by rising risk premia undermine domestic 
demand more markedly over the short term.
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the offical view ot the Magyar Nemzeti Bank.
1 The United States and Asia saw an even larger expansion by 2 percent of GDP; see Coenen et al. (2010).
2   The structural balance indicates the budgetary position as a percentage of potential GDP excluding temporary effects (e.g. business cycle). The 
method of filtering the effects of the business cycle is described, for example, by P. Kiss and Reppa (2010).
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the euro area by more than 1 percentage point by 2012 (see 
Chart 1).
Changes in fiscal policy can significantly influence 
macroeconomic developments. Understanding and 
quantifying these changes is an intriguing issue in itself, and 
all the more so as the euro area is the most important 
export market for Hungary. Therefore. the fiscal tightening 
envisaged for our trade partners may have a considerable 
influence on Hungary’s domestic growth and inflation 
outlook over the monetary policy horizon. In this article we 
make an attempt to estimate this effect as well.
MACRoeCoNoMiC eFFeCtS oF FiSCAl 
PoliCy
Different economic theories assess the effects of fiscal 
policy in various ways.3 In the traditional Keynesian 
framework, fiscal policy can stabilise the short-term 
fluctuations of economic activity and employment by 
regulating demand. By contrast, longer-term supply effects 
play a predominant role in the neoclassical theory (e.g. 
Baxter and King, 1993). In these models rising government 
expenditures deteriorate households’ financial wealth as 
households predict that tax rates will be raised inevitably 
in order to finance the rising public debt (Ricardian 
equivalence). Striving to increase their savings, households 
are willing to work more and restrain their consumption. In 
the short run, the growth in labour supply increases the 
level of employment, investment and output.
The negative wealth effect derived in the neoclassical 
approach leads to a decline in consumption, which 
contradicts empirical observations. The situation is the 
same in the New Keynesian theory as well, which assumes 
that prices are sticky over the short term; in other words, 
they adjust to the changed supply-demand conditions 
with a lag (e.g. Linnemann and Schabert, 2003). One way 
to eliminate the negative response of consumption would 
be to assume, in addition to short-term price rigidity, that 
a fraction of households are unable to save and borrow 
(e.g. Galí et al., 2007). These households spend all of the 
extra income generated by the budgetary expansion, and 
thus the response of aggregate consumption can be 
positive.4
The effects of fiscal expansions and adjustments are 
typically symmetrical in the economic models. Accordingly, 
based on the mechanisms described above, while fiscal 
tightening restricts GDP and consumption over the short 
term, it also reduces inflation and lowers the level of real 
interest rates. However, it has been observed in several 
cases that fiscal consolidation boosts the economy even 
over the short term.5 One possible explanation for this is 
that a credible fiscal adjustment may significantly mitigate 
the risk of sovereign default, and growing confidence may 
lead to a more pronounced decline in interest rates, while 
it boosts consumption as well as investment.
In addition, fiscal policy instruments can influence the 
potential output of the economy through several channels 
(e.g. by the distorting effect of taxes).6 Fiscal adjustments 
can be expressly beneficial over the long run − for example, 
when the fiscal room for manoeuvre created by the curbing 
of public debt is used to reduce distorting taxes.
ReSPoNSe oF tHe euRo AReA to 
FiSCAl SHoCKS
The macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy have been 
examined by a great number of empirical studies.7 The 
literature contains simulations performed both with 
traditional macroeconomic models and dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) models. In our analysis we use 
the results of several models calibrated for the euro area, 
along with times series estimates which are often used as a 
starting point for the calibration of macro-models.
There are several differences between the models used, 
depending on whether they involve forward-looking 
expectations and on the level of detail in the presentation 
of fiscal policy and global economic relations (see Table 1). 
They share a common characteristic: the effect of fiscal 
policy on potential growth is not modelled.
We examine three DSGE models calibrated for the euro 
area, which share certain common features in that they are 
based on rational expectations and forward-looking 
behaviour; however, they contain different frictions and 
liquidity constraints.8 The GIMF used by the IMF is also a 
DSGE model, but covers several global economic regions. 
3 For a more detailed description of theoretical effects and further references see, for example, Beetsma (2008).
4   The consequences will be similar if the utility of households depends on the extent to which their current consumption differs from that of the previous 
period (habit formation, e.g. Burnside et al., 2004). In this case, the positive consumption effect of an increase in current income could, over the 
short run, offset the negative effect of a decline in wealth.
5 The literature of this topic is summarised, for example, in Horváth et al. (2006).
6 See, for example, the simulations of d’Auria et al. (2009) for the EU Member States.
7 For a detailed overview of the relevant literature see, for example, Spilimbergo et al. (2009). 
8 We used the models in the database of Wieland et al. (2009) to perform our own simulations.MNB BulletiN • DeceMBer 2010 19
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The (old) Area Wide Model developed by the ECB contains 
only a limited form of forward-looking expectations, while 
the OECD’s model does not contains them at all.
Perotti (2005) estimates VAR models for five OECD countries 
and proceeds to identify fiscal shocks from changes in the 
cyclically adjusted expenditures. The impulse response of 
the euro area is defined as the average of the two European 
countries included in the sample (Germany and the United 
Kingdom).
A fiscal shock is interpreted as a persistent change in 
(cyclically adjusted) government spending by 1 percent of 
GDP. The shock should be interpreted ex ante: taking 
account of second-round effects (those including the 
response of the economy), the change in GDP-proportionate 
spending may well be different than 1 percentage point. In 
the case of the GIMF model we apply a different shock: 
here, with a fairly typical combination of income and 
expenditure side measures, the budget balance changes 
persistently by 1 percent of GDP (ex post).
Although this definition of shocks may be debated, after 
careful consideration we can conclude that our calculations 
may indeed yield an upper estimate for the effects of a real 
fiscal intervention. There may be a difference, for example, 
in the effect of the different fiscal policy instruments on 
GDP. The largest multipliers typically belong to expenditures, 
while in the short run, the impact of taxes and transfers on 
GDP may be one quarter or one half of the values presented 
above.9 According to the survey of the IMF (2010a), between 
2010 and 2013 most countries intend to focus adjustments 
primarily on the expenditure side; therefore, the 
expenditure multiplier can be a useful starting point. It 
table 1









Adolfson et al. (2007) Yes Partly
Exogenous rest of  
the world
Wieland et al. (2009)
Coenen et al. (2008, NAWM) Yes Yes Two regions
Smets and Wouters (2003) Yes No Closed economy
Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model 
(GIMF)
Yes Yes Multi-region Kumhof et al. (2010)
Area Wide Model (AWM) Partly No
Exogenous rest of  
the world
Wieland et al. (2009)
OECD model No Yes Multi-region Hervé et al. (2010)
9 See, for example, Coenen et al. (2010), Spilimbergo et al. (2009).
Chart 2
impact of fiscal tightening on the economy of the euro area
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could pose another problem that we do not reckon with the 
limited room for manoeuvre of monetary policy. With the 
current low interest rate levels there is less room for 
interest rate cuts, which can dampen the negative growth 
impact of a fiscal tightening. In our simulations, however, 
the interest rate level changes only marginally, by no more 
than 30 basis points, which may not necessarily imply an 
effective constraint for European monetary policy. Finally, 
we also ignore possible positive impacts on potential 
output, although they are more likely to materialise over 
longer horizons.
The impulse response of the euro area’s GDP fundamentally 
depends on the assumption about how forward-looking 
economic agents are (see Chart 2). In the DSGE models, with 
forward-looking economic agents the multiplier is around 0.7 
percent in the first year before dissipating slowly. If the 
expectations are mostly backward-looking − as in the AWM 
model − the value of the multiplier may remain above 1 for 
a duration of two years. The impulse responses of the OECD 
model are more moderate, owing in part to the endogenous 
monetary policy response, and in part to growing imports 
and deteriorating international competitiveness in the 
context of the fiscal expansion. The time series estimates 
appear to be closer to the results of the DSGE models. At the 
same time, the impulse responses of the SVAR model based 
on empirical observations suggest a stronger effect.
The behaviour of prices reflects the response of economic 
activity: the models with a greater multiplier effect have 
stronger impulse responses. With forward-looking 
expectations, the effect on prices is negligible; the inflation 
rate changes by a maximum of 0.1 percentage point.
Which models generate more credible impulse responses? 
The answer is not clear. The DSGE models may better 
capture a world where a fiscal adjustment leads to a more 
sustainable public debt path, strengthening the confidence 
of economic agents. At the same time, based on French 
data, Bouthevillain and Dufrénot (2010) argue that the 
short-term Keynesian effects of fiscal policy may increase 
at times of crisis because, for example, growing 
unemployment tightens consumers’ liquidity constraints. 
This scenario may be better described by traditional 
macroeconomic models that lack a forward-looking 
approach.
iMPACt oF euRo AReA FiSCAl 
ADjuStMeNtS oN tHe HuNGARiAN 
eCoNoMy
We quantify the impact of the fiscal adjustment measures 
envisaged in the euro area on the Hungarian economy by 
means of DELPHI, a macroeconometric model used for the 
preparation of the forecast presented in the Quarterly 
Report on Inflation.10 In the following, we briefly describe 
the channels taken into account during the simulations.
On the one hand, exports are reduced by the decline in 
external demand resulting from the restrictions; on the 
other hand, owing to unfavourable sales prospects, firms 
restrain investment projects.11 At the same time, due to the 
high import content of exports and investment, the 
deterioration in net exports is moderate and temporary 
only. With waning demand, firms’ labour demand declines 
as well, leading to a downturn in wages and employment. 
The resulting shortfall in labour income reduces 
consumption, albeit to a lesser extent than the change in 
exports and investment. This generates a permanent, 
overall decline in GDP.
Lower wages, as well as the negative output gap resulting 
from the drop in demand, reduce inflation. In addition, 
fiscal tightening lowers inflation across the euro area, 
which may reduce domestic inflation as well through the 
pricing of imported goods.12 
In our simulation we examine a scenario where public 
expenditures are cut (permanently) by 0.5 percent in two 
consecutive years in the euro area. The extent of the fiscal 
tightening is similar in magnitude to that of the adjustment 
plans announced in the summer of 2010 in Western Europe.
Over the monetary policy horizon, the adjustments 
deteriorate our growth outlook perceivably, while they 
lower inflation only slightly. The domestic GDP shortfall 
could amount to one half of that observed in the euro area; 
European adjustments may lower Hungarian GDP growth by 
10   For the main characteristics of the DELPHI model, see Box 3-1 of the June issue of the Quarterly Report on Inflation (MNB, 2010a). A complete 
description of the model will be published shortly in an MNB Working Paper.
11   In the DELPHI model we capture the developments in global economic activity by the import of our foreign trade partners. Since Hungarian exports 
are not limited to the euro area, we first use the GDP change of the euro area to define changes in the aggregate output of our foreign trade partners. 
In the second step, based on this figure we calculate the response of our foreign trade partners’ aggregate import: If the shock originates in domestic 
demand, this may amount to around 1.5 times the impulse response of GDP (see, for example, Fagan et al., 2005 and Stirböck, 2006). 
12   The proxy variable of global market prices in the price equation of the DELPHI model is the price index of the euro area’s traded goods. We assume 
that they change in line with the total consumer price index. This assumption does not modify the results notably.MNB BulletiN • DeceMBer 2010 21
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around 0.2 percentage points in the next two years (see 
Chart 3). This is not surprising: as a small, open economy, 
the growth prospects of Hungary are closely related to the 
business conditions of its foreign trade partners.
In the context of lower import prices and waning domestic 
demand, inflation may also slacken somewhat. Since the 
fiscal adjustment lowers euro area inflation only moderately, 
the main driving force behind the developments in 
Hungarian inflation is the downturn in domestic demand. As 
such, relative to the effect on GDP, the decline in inflation 
materialises with a lag. Inflation may decline by less than 
0.1 percentage point overall, primarily from the second 
year following the adjustment (see Chart 3).
Although the adjustments taken thus far are not expected 
to push the Hungarian economy back into recession, the 
short-term risks are on the downside. The debt crisis in the 
peripheral countries of the euro area is far being over, and 
most recently, Ireland announced that it would need loans 
from the international organisations to finance its public 
deficit. If the crisis spills over, further fiscal tightening can 
be expected in other European countries as well, leading to 
a more pronounced downturn in international economic 
activity. In this environment an even graver consequence 
could be a possible deterioration of Hungary’s risk 
assessment in view of its large public debt and the 
uncertainties surrounding its fiscal policy. Growing debt 
service burdens, in turn, could directly restrain domestic 
demand as well.13
The longer-term effects are more uncertain. Fiscal 
adjustment measures could increase the potential growth 
of the euro area. To achieve this, deficit reduction should 
be combined with structural reforms designed to prevent 
the re-accumulation of the deficit and to improve 
employment and investment sentiment. This could imply 
additional growth for Hungary as well. However, there is no 
guarantee that deficit reduction increases potential output. 
For example, an adjustment based on corporate income 
taxes may lead to a downturn in investment projects, 
deteriorating long-term growth prospects.
CoNCluSioNS
The global financial crisis led to a severe global economic 
recession. Wherever it was possible, in an effort to mitigate 
the extent of the downturn, governments deployed fiscal 
policy instruments as well. However, the economic stimulus 
and the efforts to bail out the financial system imposed a 
large debt burden on the countries concerned. In the wake 
of the Greek debt crisis, concerns about the sustainability 
of public debt have intensified. As a result, from the 
summer of 2010 several euro area member states announced 
plans for fiscal austerity.
In our article we presented the short-term economic effects 
of the fiscal adjustments envisaged in the euro area, and 
the resulting impact on the economic growth and inflation 
prospects of Hungary. According to the economic theories, 
short-term growth effects originate from changes in actual 
13   The possible effects of this scenario are illustrated by one of the risk scenarios in the November issue of the MNB’s Quarterly Report on Inflation 
(MNB, 2010c).
Chart 3
impact of the envisaged euro area fiscal tightening on the Hungarian economy
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demand on the one hand, and changes in household wealth, 
on the other hand.
We quantified the effects of the adjustments on the 
economies of Western Europe using several macroeconomic 
models and time series estimates. We applied the MNB’s 
forecasting model to analyse the domestic effects.
The new adjustment plans announced from the summer of 
2010 could markedly decelerate growth in the euro area. 
Since Hungary is a small, open economy, more subdued 
foreign economic activity inevitably restricts our own 
growth prospects. Adjustments in the euro area may lower 
Hungarian GDP growth by around 0.2 percentage points in 
the next two years, with a slight impact on inflation. These 
effects have already been taken into account in the 
baseline forecast of the August issue of the MNB’s Quarterly 
Report on Inflation (MNB, 2010b).
If the debt crisis of peripheral euro area countries escalates, 
we should expect even more severe effects than presented 
here. To a smaller extent, this is due to the fact that the 
new round of tightening would restrict our export 
opportunities even further. The more significant − and more 
difficult to assess − effect is related to the vulnerability of 
the Hungarian economy. The risk perception of Hungary is 
very sensitive to changes in global investor sentiment. An 
increase in risk premia raises the debt burden of the private 
sector and the government, which may lead to a more 
pronounced contraction in domestic demand. One of the 
risk paths of the inflation forecast drawn up in the 
November issue of the MNB’s Quarterly Report on Inflation 
(MNB, 2010c) presents a similar scenario.
For the time being, we have no information on the longer-
term impact of the adjustments. The potential output of 
the euro area may increase if balance improvement is 
accompanied by structural reforms. This could imply 
additional growth for Hungary as well. However, there is no 
guarantee for these effects: their extent and direction 
depend on the type of the deficit reduction measures.
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